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Leatherdale v. Leatherdale*: Family Law — Division 
O f Non-Family Assets.
T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada in terp re ted  the O ntario  Family Law 
Reform  Act2 and found a spousal interest in property  not found by the 
O ntario  C ourt o f Appeal. T h e  majority, per Laskin C.J.C., allowed the wife 
a share o f  non-family assets denied to her by the C ourt o f  Appeal. Estey 
J., dissenting, would have allowed her still m ore.3
T h e  case has some relevance to the New Brunswick M arital Property 
Act* for by substituting the appropriate  sections some light may be thrown 
on how the Suprem e C ourt o f Canada would view the New Brunswick Act 
in a p ro p e r case.
In Leatherdale the husband and wife were separated and the family 
assets were settled. T h e  wife applied for a share o f the non-family assets. 
T he trial judge allowed the wife a one-half interest in approximately $40,000 
w orth o f  Bell C anada shares un d er section 8 o f the O ntario  Act.5 T he 
O ntario  C ourt of Appeal allowed the husband’s appeal on the ground that 
the wife did not bring herself within section 8 o f the Act as she had not 
contribu ted  to the acquisition o f the shares.*
T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f C anada allowed the wife’s appeal in part, having 
found that she had contribu ted  within the m eaning o f section 8 as a wage- 
ea rn er du rin g  nine o f the eighteen years o f the m arriage. However, the 
m ajority o f the court held that her work in the home, by itself, did not 
constitute a contribution to the acquisition o f the shares in Bell Canada 
and consequently reduced  the original award by one half. O n that point 
Estey J . disagreed. He felt her work in the hom e was a contribution within 
the m eaning o f section 8.
T o  apply the case in New Brunswick one must substitute certain p ro ­
visions o f the New Brunswick M arital Property Act for the provisions o f the 
O ntario  Law Reform Act, as follows:
O ntario  section 4 — see New Brunswick sections 2, 3, 7, and 8
O ntario  section 8 — see New Brunswick section 42.
iFamiiy Law Reform Act, S tatutes of O n ta rio  1978, c. C-2 here in a fte r called the O n ta rio  Act. 
sSupra, foo tno te  1.
iM antal Property Act, N.B. Acts 1980, c. M -l.l ,  here in a fte r called the  New Brunswick Act.
'(1982). 45 N.R. 40 (S.C.C.).
5Leatherdale v. Leatherdale (1980), 19 R.F.L. (2d) 141 (Ont. H.C.).
6Leatherdale v. Leatherdale (1980), 118 D.L.R (3d) 72; 19 R.F.L. (2d) 148 (Ont. C.A.).
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T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f C anada said that the O ntario  Act em bodied 
two completely separate schemes; one according to section 4, the o ther 
according to section 8.
C onsidering section 4 o f the O ntario  Act in its totality it is apparen t a 
division o f family assets could be m ade that was equal o r unequal. Further, 
if such division o f family assets results in an inequitable distribution o f 
property  between the spouses, a court could use subsection 4(6) to o rder 
a distribution o f non-family assets to correct the inequity. It seems quite 
clear that u n d er subsection 4(6) no division o f the non-family assets could 
be m ade unless an inequity would otherw ise result.
T h e  scheme for division o f p roperty  u n d er the New Brunswick Act is 
very similar to O ntario ’s section 4. Section 2 stipulates that child care, 
household m anagem ent and financial contribution are o f “equal im por­
tance in assessing the contributions o f  the respective spouses.”7 Section 3 
sets out the events which will “trigger” the division o f m arital property, 
these being: divorce, a declaration o f nullity o r m arriage breakdow n.” Sec­
tion 7 provides for an unequal division o f m arital property  in certain 
circum stances9 and  section 8 for a division o f non-m arital property  in o rder 
to prevent inequity .10
It should be noted that both o f the schemes described above provide 
for a distribution o f property  between husband and wife, taking into con­
sideration the uniqueness o f the family relationship.
O ntario ’s section 8 sets up  an entirely d ifferen t system by which the 
non-owning spouse can obtain a proprie tary  interest in certain non-family 
assets if that spouse has “contributed work, money o r m oney’s worth in 
respect o f  the acquisition” o f them . T h ere  seems to be no limit as to the 
tim ing o f an application u n d er section 8 and property  is to be divided 
according to the principles o f resulting trust, ignoring the domestic rela­
tionship. It would seem that section 42 o f the New Brunswick Act com ­
prehends the same principles.
A lthough O n tario ’s section 8 and New Brunswick’s section 42 provide 
similar criteria for assessing what constitutes a contribution, the O ntario  
section is limited to property  “o ther than family assets” while the New 
Brunswick section applies to “any p roperty”.
In Leatherdale, Estey J. dissented on the question o f what am ounted to 
a contribution to the acquisition o f  non-family assets. T h e  majority o f  the
7C om pare  subsection 4(5) O n ta rio  Act.
8C om pare  subsection 4(1) O n tario  Act.
9C om pare  subsection 4(4) O n ta rio  Act.
‘“C om pare subsection 4(6) O n ta rio  Act.
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court, th rough  Laskin C.J.C., felt that work in the hem e by itself would 
not am ount to a sufficient contribution. Mr. Justice Estey could see no valid 
reason why household m anagem ent should not, in the appropriate  circum ­
stances, qualify as such a contribution. Indeed, his approach seems to follow 
the reasoning o f Laskin’s dissent in Murdoch v. M urdoch11 and the majority 
decisions in Rathwell v. Rathw ell'2 and Becker v. Pettkus , 1S — the cases which 
developed the application o f trust principles to the marital relationship.
It is clear on the o ther hand, that the work done by Mrs. M urdock, 
Mrs. Rathwell and Ms. Becker can m ore readily be seen as generating 
income than the household duties perform ed by Mrs. Leatherdale. I his 
approach is analogous to that taken by M adam Justice Wilson in the O ntario  
C ourt o f  Appeal (as she then was) in Young v. Young where she stated:
While I am sure that the wife’s assumption of the child care and household 
management responsibilities contributed in some measure to the assets the cou­
ple were able to acquire, maintain and improve during the marriage . . .  I am 
not satisfied that it played any larger role than the husband’s dedication to his 
role as provider.14
In o ther words m ore than a contribution to the m arriage by perfo rm ­
ance o f household duties is needed to come within the term s o f Ontario 's 
section 8. In view o f Madam Justice Wilson’s statem ent in Young, echoed 
by the C hief Justice in Leatherdale, the contribution o f the non-owning 
spouse must have a closer relation to the actual acquisition o f the particular 
non-fam ily assets in o rd e r to meet the statutory requirem ent.
In applying the Leatherdale case to the New Brunswick Act it is probable 
that the Suprem e C ourt o f C anada would find that section 3 provides a 
scheme for equal division o f marital property , section 7 for unequal division 
and section 8 for a division o f non-m arital p roperty  to prevent an inequity.15 
It should be rem em bered that O ntario ’s subsection 4(6) and New B runs­
wick’s section 8 are identical. F u rther the Suprem e C ourt would probably 
see New Brunswick’s section 42 as an entirely separate scheme whereby an 
interested person could apply for a division o f any property at any time 
d u rin g  o r following a m arriage.16
"(1973). 41 D.L.R. (3d) 367 (S.C.C.).
Ii!(1978), 83 D.L.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.).
‘»(1980). 117 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (S.C.C.).
I4( 1981), 120 D.L.R. (3d) 662. at 667 (O nt. C.A.); 21 R.F.L. (2d) 388. at 393 (O nt. C.A.)
,5Indeed  this was the  app roach  followed bv the  New Brunswick C ourt o f  Appeal in LeBouthillier v. l.e- 
Bouihtlhrr (1982), 39 N.B.R. (2d) 20.
l6Note how ever s. 42(8) o f  the  N.B. Act preven ts an application u n d e r ss. 42( 1) “with respect to a n \  property  
w here an application o r an o rd e r  has been m ade respecting  that p roperty  u n d e r Part I." T h is sub-section 
may suggest som e in ter-re lation  betw een s. 42 and  the above-m entioned sections. However, the  purpose 
o f 42(8) may simply be to prevent a m ultiplicity o f court actions respecting  the  sam e property .
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This, however, would not seem to be the approach taken by the Appeal 
C ourt o f  New Brunswick in Bank o f M ontreal v. Kuchuck fcf Kuchuck. l7 Strat­
ton J. A., speaking for the court, indiciated that s. 42 would not be available 
unless there was a m arriage breakdown. He said,
. . . the scheme o f the legislation is to continue the separate property regime 
between spouses until a marriage breakdown occurs. If this is correct, it would,
I think, be unreasonable . . .  to permit a creditor to apply for a determination 
as to the ownership o f the marital home when the spouses themselves could not 
do so until there was a legally recognizable marriage breakdown.18
It should be stressed, however, that the question before the court in 
Kuchuk was w hether o r not a creditor could use section 42 in o rd er to force 
the sale o f a m arital hom e un d er a writ o f execution. T o  allow such an 
action would certainly, as S tratton J.A. rightly points out, run  counter to 
the scheme o f the Act as the marital hom e is recognized as the most im­
portan t item in the category o f marital property. T herefore, it is perhaps 
still open to the New Brunswick C ourt o f Appeal to divide non-m arital 
p roperty  u n d er section 42 in a case where there has not been a m arriage 
breakdown.
An im portant question left open by the Suprem e C ourt o f  C anada in 
Leatherdale was w hether the O ntario  Act provided a complete code o r if it 
was still open in considering non-family assets to apply the doctrines o f 
resulting and constructive trusts. T h e  C hief Justice, in the last paragraph 
o f his judgm en t, left that question unansw ered. However, Estey J. ex­
pressed his agreem ent with the C hief Justice that the statute law prevails.
Perhaps the best view is that the statute will prevail where there is any 
conflict between the common law and the statutory provisions. T he issue 
is com plicated by the fact that the reform  legislation in both O ntario and 
New Brunswick was enacted before the Suprem e Court in Becker v. Pettkus19 
adopted the principle o f constructive trust as it relates to marital property. 
T herefo re , a question arises as to w hether the codification o f resulting trust 
in section 15 o f the New Brunswick Act excludes by implication the use o f 
constructive trust in relation to property  disputes between m arried persons 
in New Brunswick.
A lthough few, if any definite conclusions in regard to the New B runs­
wick M arita l Property Act can be reached from  reading the Leatherdale case 
it is clearly im portant in attem pting to ascertain the scheme o f the M arital 
Property Act particularly in relation to non-m arital property and the fate o f 
the doctrine o f resulting and constructive trusts!
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